Shut your hole

Noise Canceled Internet with Pi-hole

Yehuda Deutsch

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

The modern web is loud

Ads, trackers, and telemetry follow you from page to page and app to app

  • Every page load calls dozens of third-party domains
  • Apps and smart devices phone home constantly
  • Browser extensions only cover the browser
  • Your TV, your fridge, and your guests' phones don't run uBlock
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

The plan

Block the noise at the network level, before it ever reaches your devices

  • Pi-hole on a Raspberry Pi
  • Blocklists - what, where, and how many
  • Custom allow / block rules
  • Unbound - recursive DNS and internal names
  • WireGuard - taking it on the road
  • Questions
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Who am I?

Yehuda Deutsch

Software Developer with a sweet tooth for infrastructure

Principal DevOps Engineer at Palo Alto Networks
SDLC / Internal Platform

Open Source / Data / Knowledge activist

Self Hoster

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

A note on these slides

  • Slides were generated with the help of AI / LLM tools
  • All knowledge is based on actual use and experience
  • Content has been thoroughly reviewed
  • The title was generated with the assistance of my 7-year-old
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

How does Pi-hole work?

A DNS sinkhole - it answers every DNS query on your network, and lies about the bad ones

  • Devices ask Pi-hole "where is ads.example.com?"
  • Blocked domain - Pi-hole answers 0.0.0.0
  • Allowed domain - Pi-hole asks upstream, caches and answers
  • The connection to the tracker never happens
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Only the questions, not the traffic

Pi-hole controls name resolution, nothing else

  • Only DNS queries reach Pi-hole
  • The traffic itself still routes as usual - device → router → internet
  • Pi-hole never sees, inspects or filters the actual connections
  • Not a firewall, not a proxy - if Pi-hole is down, nothing resolves, but routing still works
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Caveats

Blocking a name blocks everything behind it

  • Same domain for ads and content - can't block one without the other
  • Paramount+ - ads share a domain with watch-time tracking: block it, lose your watch position
  • Hardcoded DNS and DNS-over-HTTPS skip Pi-hole entirely
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

One layer, not the whole wall

Pi-hole is part of the protection, not all of it

  • Browser extensions - see the page, block by URL and element
  • Filtering DNS services (OpenDNS, NextDNS, Quad9...) - protection off the home network
  • Device and OS settings - telemetry toggles, app permissions
  • Complementary, not instead - each layer covers what the others can't
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

The hardware

Pi-hole is light, any Raspberry Pi will do

  • Raspberry Pi (even a Zero 2 W), wired Ethernet preferred
  • Raspberry Pi OS Lite (64-bit) via Raspberry Pi Imager
  • Preconfigure hostname, user and SSH in the Imager
  • Give it a fixed address - DHCP reservation on the router
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Installing Pi-hole

sudo apt update && sudo apt full-upgrade -y

curl -sSL https://install.pi-hole.net | bash
# or, if you read before you pipe:
wget -O basic-install.sh https://install.pi-hole.net
less basic-install.sh
sudo bash basic-install.sh

# set the web interface password
pihole setpassword

Web interface: http://<pi-address>/admin

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Point the network at it

The "no per-device configuration" part

  • Router DHCP settings - DNS server = Pi-hole address
  • Remove any secondary DNS (it will be used to bypass)
  • Or let Pi-hole be the DHCP server, if the router can't
  • Renew leases (or wait) and watch the query log fill up
dig @<pi-address> doubleclick.net +short
# 0.0.0.0
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Lists - the concepts

  • Gravity - all subscribed lists, compiled into one database
  • Block lists and allow lists - both can be subscribed
  • Formats - hosts file, plain domains, ABP style (||domain^)
  • Groups - assign lists and rules to specific clients
  • Updated weekly, or on demand with pihole -g
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Lists - choosing

More domains is not more silence, it's more breakage

  • Start with one good list, add only when you notice noise
  • Prefer maintained lists over huge stale ones
  • Overlap is free, false positives are not
  • Know your household's tolerance
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Lists - where to look

  • StevenBlack/hosts - the default, a solid baseline
  • HaGeZi DNS blocklists - tiered from Light to Ultimate
  • OISD - big / small, focused on low false positives
  • The Firebog - curated collection, ticked lists are "safe"
# which list is blocking this?
pihole -q some.domain.com
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Custom allow / block

Your rules win over the lists

Kind Matches Example
Exact exactly that domain s.youtube.com
Wildcard domain and all subdomains tiktok.com
Regex anything matching the pattern (^|\.)tracking\.

Allow beats block, exact beats regex

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Custom allow / block - CLI

# block
pihole deny ads.example.com --comment "noisy"
pihole --wild tiktok.com
pihole --regex '(^|\.)telemetry\.'

# allow
pihole allow s.youtube.com --comment "watch history"
pihole --allow-wild example-cdn.com

# remove
pihole deny -d ads.example.com

# where did it come from?
pihole -q s.youtube.com

Or the web interface - Domains page, with groups and comments

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Unbound - why?

Pi-hole still needs an upstream to answer the questions it doesn't block

  • Recursive - asks the root, TLD and authoritative servers directly
  • No single upstream provider sees all your queries
  • DNSSEC validation
  • Lightweight - a few MB of RAM, same Pi
  • Internal names for your home-hosted services
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Installing Unbound

sudo apt install unbound
sudoedit /etc/unbound/unbound.conf.d/pi-hole.conf
server:
    interface: 127.0.0.1
    port: 5335
    do-ip6: no
    harden-glue: yes
    harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
    edns-buffer-size: 1232
    prefetch: yes
    private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
    private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
    private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Wire it to Pi-hole

sudo unbound-checkconf
sudo systemctl restart unbound

# test Unbound directly
dig pi-hole.net @127.0.0.1 -p 5335
dig dnssec-failed.org @127.0.0.1 -p 5335   # SERVFAIL - good

# make it Pi-hole's only upstream
sudo pihole-FTL --config dns.upstreams '["127.0.0.1#5335"]'

Or in the web interface: Settings → DNS → custom upstream 127.0.0.1#5335

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Full resolution vs. upstream filtering

Full resolution Forward to a filtering service
Who sees all your queries Nobody The provider
Who sees each query The servers for that zone, and your ISP Only the provider (encrypted)
Extra filtering Pi-hole lists only Provider's malware / phishing / category blocks
Dependency Root and authoritative servers The provider being up
First lookup Slower, then cached Fast, big shared cache

Either way - Pi-hole filters first, Unbound keeps the local zone

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Unbound - forwarding upstream

server:
    tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt

forward-zone:
    name: "."
    forward-tls-upstream: yes
    # Quad9 - malware blocking, DNS over TLS
    forward-addr: 9.9.9.9@853#dns.quad9.net
    forward-addr: 149.112.112.112@853#dns.quad9.net
sudo unbound-checkconf && sudo systemctl restart unbound
dig isitblocked.org @127.0.0.1 -p 5335   # NXDOMAIN - Quad9 is filtering
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

A local zone

Names for the things you host at home

server:
    local-zone: "mytoynet.de." static
    local-data: "nas.mytoynet.de.      IN A 192.168.1.10"
    local-data: "jellyfin.mytoynet.de. IN A 192.168.1.20"
    local-data: "pihole.mytoynet.de.   IN A 192.168.1.2"

    local-data-ptr: "192.168.1.10 nas.mytoynet.de"
dig nas.mytoynet.de +short   # 192.168.1.10
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Why a dedicated domain?

A cheap domain, used only at home

  • Real TLS certificates via ACME DNS-01 - no IPs published
  • Wildcard certificate - *.mytoynet.de
  • You own the resolution - no accidental answers from other networks
  • Avoids the .corp, .dev, and notoriously .local accidents
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

redirect vs transparent

Zone type Name has local-data Name has no local-data
static local answer NXDOMAIN
transparent local answer resolve normally
redirect zone's answer for every name in the zone (n/a)
server:
    local-zone: "mytoynet.de." transparent           # nas is local, www is public
    local-data: "nas.mytoynet.de. IN A 192.168.1.10"
    local-zone: "apps.mytoynet.de." redirect         # *.apps -> reverse proxy
    local-data: "apps.mytoynet.de. IN A 192.168.1.30"
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

WireGuard - on the road

Take the silence (and your home services) with you

  • VPN tunnel from your phone / laptop back home
  • Client uses the home Pi-hole as its DNS
  • AllowedIPs decides what goes through the tunnel
[Interface]
DNS = 192.168.1.2

[Peer]
Endpoint = home.example.com:51820
AllowedIPs = 192.168.1.0/24, 10.8.0.0/24   # home only
# AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0             # everything
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Glossary - DNS & Pi-hole

Term Meaning
DNS The internet's phone book - names to IP addresses
Resolver The server that answers a device's DNS questions
Upstream / forwarder A resolver that passes questions on to another resolver
Recursive resolver Asks the root, TLD and authoritative servers itself
Sinkhole Answers blocked names with a dead address (0.0.0.0)
Gravity Pi-hole's compiled database of all subscribed lists
DHCP Hands devices their IP address, gateway and DNS server
DoH DNS over HTTPS - can bypass the network's resolver
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Glossary - Zones, TLS & tunnels

Term Meaning
A / PTR / TXT Name → IPv4 / IP → name / free text (used for verification)
Zone A domain and everything under it
Split horizon Same name, different answers inside and outside
DNSSEC Signatures proving DNS answers weren't tampered with
ACME DNS-01 Prove domain control with a TXT record, get a certificate
CT logs Public logs of every certificate issued
Reverse proxy One entry point, routes requests to services by hostname
Split tunnel VPN carries only some traffic, the rest goes direct
Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

ATAQ?

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

Shhh...

x59.us

y@x59.us

talks.myjigs.de/2026-11-18-noise-canceled-internet/

Shut your hole - JaxLUG - 2026-11-18

* Open the network tab on any news site and count the domains * Smart TVs are some of the noisiest devices on the network * Extensions are per-browser, per-device, per-profile * The network is the one place everything passes through

* The AI did the typing, the setup on the slides is running at home * If something looks off, ask - it's real experience, so there's a real answer

* Every device already asks a DNS server before connecting anywhere, we just choose which one * Default blocking mode in v6 is NULL - 0.0.0.0 / :: answers * Upstream can be a public resolver, or (later in the talk) our own Unbound * No proxy, no TLS interception, the device just never connects

* Common misconception: "all my traffic goes through the Pi" - it doesn't, a Pi Zero couldn't handle it anyway * Once a name is resolved, the device talks directly to that IP, Pi-hole is out of the picture * A device that already knows the IP (hardcoded, cached) is not affected at all * This is why it's so light, and also why it has limits - next slide

* DNS sees a hostname, not a URL path - /ads and /resume on the same host are the same answer * Paramount+: with the domain blocked, the app can't report or fetch the playback position, every episode starts from the beginning * The fix is a per-domain trade-off: allow it (pihole allow) and accept the ads, or keep it blocked and remember where you stopped * YouTube: ads and videos share googlevideo.com hosts - Pi-hole won't fix YouTube, don't promise it * Leaks: devices with 8.8.8.8 baked in, browsers with secure DNS, Android Private DNS - more on that when we point the network at Pi-hole

* Extensions can do what DNS can't: block a path on a shared domain, hide elements, handle YouTube * Filtering DNS services follow the device anywhere without a VPN, and some add categories (malware, adult content) * They can also be Unbound's upstream at home - a trade-off between their filtering and full resolution (covered in the Unbound part) * Pi-hole covers the devices nobody can install anything on: TVs, consoles, IoT, guests * Turning off telemetry at the source beats blocking it on the way out

* Pi 3/4/5 are more than enough, a Zero 2 W works but Wi-Fi only (or a USB Ethernet adapter) * Lite - no desktop, nothing we don't need * Imager's "OS customisation" saves the need for a screen and keyboard * DHCP reservation is easier to manage than a static IP on the Pi, and keeps all addressing in one place

* The installer asks for an upstream DNS provider - pick anything, we'll replace it with Unbound later * Accept the default lists for now (StevenBlack), we'll talk about lists next * Pi-hole v6 ships its own web server, no lighttpd/PHP anymore * Config lives in /etc/pihole/pihole.toml

* Secondary DNS is not a fallback, clients use it whenever they feel like it * Some ISP routers don't allow changing DNS - Pi-hole has a built-in DHCP server, disable the router's * IPv6: routers may advertise their own DNS over RA - check that too * Known leaks: hardcoded DNS (8.8.8.8), DNS-over-HTTPS in browsers / Android Private DNS

* Gravity is the name for the merged, de-duplicated database (gravity.db) * v6 supports subscribing to allow lists too, useful for curated "don't break this" lists * hosts: "0.0.0.0 ads.example.com", plain: "ads.example.com", ABP: "||ads.example.com^" (blocks subdomains too) * Groups: the kids' tablets get a stricter list, the work laptop gets less

* A list with 3M domains, last updated 2019, mostly dead domains, isn't helping * Lists overlap a lot, Pi-hole de-duplicates, so the count on the dashboard isn't the story * Every false positive is "the internet is broken" from someone at home * "Aggressive" lists break shopping links, analytics-dependent login flows, smart-device apps

* StevenBlack: github.com/StevenBlack/hosts - unified hosts, with optional extensions * HaGeZi: github.com/hagezi/dns-blocklists - Normal or Pro is a good place to start * OISD: oisd.nl - designed to be "set and forget" * Firebog: firebog.net - green ticks are low-risk, blue ticks are more aggressive * pihole -q tells you which list (and which rule) matches a domain - first step when debugging breakage

* Exact is the most common - allow one host that a list overblocks * Wildcard in v6 is a regex generated for you: (\.|^)tiktok\.com$ * Regex is powerful, and easy to overblock with - test before you commit * s.youtube.com is a classic false positive - it breaks YouTube watch history

* v6 renamed whitelist/blacklist to allow/deny * Always add a comment - in a year you won't remember why * Query log has a one-click allow/deny for anything you see * Rules can be assigned to groups, same as lists

* Forwarders (Google, Cloudflare, Quad9) get the full list of every domain you resolve * Recursive: nobody gets the full picture, each authoritative server only sees queries for its zone * First lookup is a bit slower, cache makes up for it * Internal names: nas.mytoynet.de instead of 192.168.1.10

* Based on the Pi-hole docs config, trimmed for the slide - full version in the Pi-hole documentation * Listens only on localhost, on a non-standard port - only Pi-hole talks to it * private-address: public names are not allowed to resolve to private IPs (DNS rebinding protection), local-data is not affected * Debian may enable unbound-resolvconf, which can rewrite the Pi's resolver - see Pi-hole docs if DNS on the Pi itself breaks

* dnssec-failed.org is intentionally broken DNSSEC - a validating resolver must refuse it * Untick every other upstream, otherwise Pi-hole will happily use them too * Pi-hole keeps doing the filtering and caching, Unbound only does resolution

* Full resolution: no one has the whole list, but the queries go out in plain text - your ISP can still read them on the wire * Forwarding over TLS: the ISP sees only an encrypted connection to the provider, the provider sees everything - you pick who you trust * Filtering services add what Pi-hole lists don't: fresh malware and phishing domains, family filters * Local zones are answered before forwarding - mytoynet.de never leaves the house in both setups * Unbound still validates DNSSEC when forwarding

* Remove the forward-zone and Unbound goes back to full recursion - one block to toggle * name: "." means everything, you can also forward just one zone (e.g. a work domain to the VPN's DNS) * @853 is the DNS-over-TLS port, #dns.quad9.net is the name checked against the certificate * Other options: Cloudflare 1.1.1.2 (malware) / 1.1.1.3 (malware + adult), NextDNS with your own profile * Without forward-tls-upstream it's plain DNS on port 53 - the ISP can read it again * Give at least two addresses, otherwise one outage means no DNS at all

* A real domain you own, used only inside the house - why, on the next slide * Put it in its own file, e.g. /etc/unbound/unbound.conf.d/mytoynet.conf * static: answer from local-data, anything else in the zone is NXDOMAIN, never leaves the house * static also hides the public records of the domain (MX, www, _acme-challenge) from home clients - if you have any, use transparent (coming up) * local-data-ptr for reverse lookups - nicer names in the Pi-hole query log

TLS: * Let's Encrypt (or any ACME CA) asks you to prove control of the domain by publishing a TXT record at _acme-challenge.mytoynet.de * The CA checks a TXT record, not a reachable server - internal IPs live only in Unbound, nothing needs to be port-forwarded * Your DNS provider needs an API: certbot DNS plugins, acme.sh, lego, or a reverse proxy with built-in ACME support * Wildcards are DNS-01 only * Certificates are published in Certificate Transparency logs - a wildcard keeps your hostnames out of them too * home.arpa, .lan, .local - no public CA will issue for these, you end up clicking through warnings or running your own CA * Bonus: no more "Not secure" on the NAS, password managers and browsers behave Ownership: * A made-up suffix means whatever the current network says it means * Hotel, office, a friend's Wi-Fi - their resolver may have its own nas.lan, or forward your query to the internet * With mytoynet.de, the public DNS is authoritative and it's yours - at worst it doesn't resolve, it never resolves to a stranger * Not protection from malicious actors - an attacker controlling the network can still lie about DNS, that's what TLS and DNSSEC are for * .corp - leaked internal queries from years of AD setups, ICANN refused to delegate it because of name collisions * .dev - was a popular local suffix until Google bought the TLD, and browsers force HTTPS on all of it (HSTS preload) * .local - reserved for mDNS (Bonjour / Avahi), using it in unicast DNS gives slow or random failures, especially on macOS and phones

* static - the zone is entirely ours, what we used for mytoynet.de so far * transparent - override a few names, let the rest through * redirect - one answer for the zone and all its subdomains transparent: * Use it instead of static when the domain also has public records (a website, mail, the ACME TXT challenge) and home clients should still see them * It's the default for local-data with no local-zone declared * Gotcha: if the name exists locally but not the requested type (e.g. AAAA), you get NODATA, not the public answer redirect: * No local-data allowed below the zone name, the apex record answers everything * Put a reverse proxy in front of everything, add a new service without touching DNS * grafana.apps.mytoynet.de, git.apps.mytoynet.de -> 192.168.1.30, the proxy routes by hostname * Pair it with a *.apps.mytoynet.de wildcard certificate on the proxy - new service, new name, TLS included * Nested zones are fine - Unbound picks the most specific local-zone

* Very short version - a talk of its own * Server: wg-quick on the Pi or the router, or wg-easy in a container (PiVPN is no longer maintained) * Forward one UDP port on the router, dynamic DNS if your IP changes * Split tunnel: DNS + home network only, rest of the traffic goes direct - cheap on battery and bandwidth * Pi-hole must accept queries from the VPN subnet - Settings → DNS → "Permit all origins", safe only because port 53 is NOT forwarded * This is per-device config - the one exception to "no per-device configuration"